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Abstract
The Colombian internal conflict case pro-
vides useful scenarios, realities and dynamics 
for nourishing the debate between those who 
treat internal and interstate conflicts as discon-
nected or totally independent phenomena and 
those who argue the frequent links between 
them. This policy paper is situated in the lat-
ter school of thought, and from that angle I 
shall argue the usefulness of perceiving the 
nexus between intrastate and interstate con-
flicts, and its applicability to the Colombian 
internal conflict. The paper highlights the 
importance of taking into account the strong 
nexus in order to prevent international dis-
putes that put regional security at risk; it also 
suggests that the current Colombian peace 
process represents an historic opportunity 
for Colombia –and a great challenge for the 
Colombian society– while at the same time 
being an opportunity for thinking about a 
shared future in the South America region, 
which challenges the Colombian state and its 
performance at the international level.
Key words: Colombian internal conflict, 
peace process, interstate conflicts, regional 
security, state, shared future.
* Maestría en Asuntos Internacionales, Universidad Externado de Colombia. Docente e Investigadora, Centro 
de Investigaciones Socio-jurídicas, Facultad de Derecho, Universidad Católica de Colombia (Colombia). Grupo de 
Investigación “Persona, instituciones y exigencias de justicia”. sjmontoya@ucatolica.edu.co; politologa85mruiz@
gmail.com
Recibido: 1/03/2016/ Modificado: 26/04/2016/ Aceptado: 20/11/2016.
Para citar este artículo
Montoya Ruiz, S. (2017). Inter and intrastate conflicts nexus: The Colombian Peace process, as a means to prevent 
interstate conflicts in South America and rethink regional security. opera 20, pp. 5-33.
doi: https://doi.org/10.18601/16578651.n20.02 
Inter and intrastate conflicts nexus: 
The Colombian Peace process, 
as a means to prevent interstate 
conflicts in South America and 
rethink regional security
Sandra Montoya Ruiz*
6O P E R A ,  N o  2 0  •  E n e r o - J u n i o  2 0 1 7  •  p p .  5 - 3 3
S a n d r a  M o n t o y a  R u i z
Los nexos entre confLictos inter 
e intrAestAtALes: eL proceso de 
pAz en coLombiA como medio pArA 
prevenir confLictos interestAtALes 
en surAméricA y repensAr LA 
seguridAd regionAL
resumen
El conflicto armado interno colombiano 
brinda escenarios, dinámicas y realidades que 
permiten nutrir el debate entre quienes tratan 
los conflictos interestatales e internos como 
fenómenos desconectados o completamente 
independientes, y aquellos que argumentan 
frecuentes nexos entre ambos. Este artículo 
se sitúa en la segunda postura, y desde allí se 
argumentará la utilidad de percibir los nexos 
entre los conflictos inter e intraestatales, y la 
aplicabilidad de esta postura para el conflicto 
armado interno colombiano. El artículo re-
salta la importancia de incluir los fuertes 
nexos entre los conflictos para la prevención 
de disputas internacionales que pongan en 
riesgo la seguridad regional; así mismo, sug-
iere que el actual proceso de paz colombiano 
representa una oportunidad histórica para el 
país –que desafía fuertemente a la sociedad 
colombiana–, y, al mismo tiempo, representa 
una oportunidad para pensar en un futuro 
compartido en la región suramericana, que 
desafía al Estado colombiano y su desempeño 
en el plano internacional
Palabras clave: conflicto armado colom-
biano, proceso de paz, conflictos internos, 
conflictos interestatales, seguridad regional, 
Estado, futuro compartido.
introduction
Analyses concerning the occurrence of 
interstate conflicts in countries dealing with 
active internal conflict(s) have evolved slowly 
over the last decades (Gleditsch, Skrede and 
Schultz, 2008). Although a large body of 
work on violence and conflicts has accumu-
lated diverse approaches, they have tended 
to treat the two levels of conflict as discon-
nected phenomena (Gleditsch et al., 2008). 
However, there is a growing interest in the 
frequent connections between both levels, 
in particular after the Cold War period. In 
contrast to the initial very realist approaches, 
the Colombian internal conflict case has chal-
lenged their assumptions for decades. Indeed, 
this conflict provides useful scenarios and 
dynamics for nourishing the debate between 
those who treat the two types of conflicts as 
totally independent phenomena and those 
who argue the frequent links between internal 
and interstate conflicts. This policy paper is 
situated in the latter school of thought, and 
from that angle I shall argue the usefulness 
of perceiving the nexus between intrastate 
and inter-state conflicts, and its applicability 
to the Colombian intrastate conflict. Thus, 
the paper highlights the importance of tak-
ing into account the strong nexus in order 
to prevent international disputes that put 
regional security at risk.
After a brief description of this nexus, 
and how its characteristics are applicable in 
the Colombian conflict, the discussion will 
move to consider the meaning of these find-
ings in preventing the likelihood of interstate 
disputes in South America. I shall particularly 
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draw attention to the current Colombian 
peace process as a means of conflict prevention 
in the region. The analysis leads to quite dif-
ferent conclusions as compared to those that 
result from the adoption of perspectives that 
treat intrastate conflicts as disadvantages or 
obstacles for seeking/achieving cooperation. 
Consequently, it is suggested that the current 
Colombian peace process is indeed an historic 
opportunity for Colombia, while at the same 
time being an opportunity for a shared future 
in the region.
The paper is organized into two main 
parts. First, it outlines the intrastate Colom-
bian conflict, its treatment by the state and the 
‘intermestic’1 nature of the conflict, while it 
underlines the combination of domestic and 
international arenas in the strategies followed 
by the state. In order to give a multi-dimen-
sional approach on the Colombian conflict, I 
will briefly describe: a) the rationale of illegal 
armed groups and their financing sources, b) 
intervention, externalization strategies and 
collateral effects, c) the role of territorial proxi-
mity on the border zones. In addition, it is 
necessary to mention the usage of bordering 
areas by the illegal armed groups which have 
appeared in this dynamic context. All of those 
elements have been –but not simultaneously, 
and with different levels of influence– sources 
of tension in the bilateral relations between 
Colombia and its neighboring countries (See: 
Annex 1). All of them are considered by dif-
ferent authors as civil war issues and dynamics 
that can also have an impact on the occurrence 
of international disputes. In the second part, 
I will consider the current peace process with 
the farc as an historic opportunity at local, 
national and regional levels. For this purpose, 
an overview of the current peace process will 
be provided. Then, the role of the state as an 
agent of change in Colombia and beyond will 
be underlined.
On the basis of previous research, the 
presence of all of these elements suggests 
challenging but constructive ways for un-
derstanding the Colombian internal conflict 
and its derivations. One of the possible paths 
is proposed in this paper, based on findings 
pointed out by Gleditsch, Salehyan and Ken-
neth, Dhiel, Singer and Garhnam, Vasquez 
and Valeriano, Hensel, Wood, Starr, Pardo 
and Carvajal, Echandía, oasis2, the Colom-
bian Foreign Affairs Policy Mission 20103, 
Cabrera, Valenzuela, and others. From their 
findings, and by taking into account the ongo-
ing Colombian peace process and challenges, 
I will argue that the lack of resolution of the 
Colombian internal conflict increases the 
likelihood of interstate conflicts in the South 
1 This concept has been introduced in International Relations in reference to political affairs that are of both 
international and domestic concerns.
2 oasis - Observatory of International Systems Analysis, University Externado of Colombia.
3 The Colombian Foreign Affairs Ministry commissioned, in 2009, seven outstanding experts, in order to de-
velop a more effective foreign affairs policy. The commissioners were: Camilo Reyes, Gustavo Bell, Hernando José 
Gómez, Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, Mauricio Reina, Sandra Borda and Socorro Ramirez. See: Bell et al. (2010).
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American region, since there are characteristics 
that tend to result in a strong nexus between 
intrastate and interstate conflicts. However, 
preventing the latent risk of interstate disputes 
in the region seems to be possible by way of 
supporting the current Colombian peace pro-
cess and the resolution of the conflict.
Although this paper attempts to bring 
to the fore the importance of the Colombian 
peace process, the paper borrows constructi-
vist and idealist lenses, and through them 
treats social change as possible and dissimi-
lar in the different ‘degrees of statehood’ 
(Clapham, 1998). The kind of support re-
quired for seeking this goal will be, in practice, 
defined by the extent to which the stakehol-
ders, whether public or private, would be able 
and willing to participate at the national level. 
Not only is this participation required, but 
the stakeholders are also called upon to be a 
part of the process belonging to the national 
level while some of them are also involved in 
international/global levels. Care needs to be 
taken to ensure a responsible and ethical path 
in which multilateral, national and local actors 
respond and perceive to what extent they have 
to be involved with the successful resolution 
of the Colombian conflict.
interstAte And intrAstAte nexus  
in the coLombiAn confLict
intrastate colombian conflict,  
state treatment and ‘intermestic’ nature
The Colombian internal conflict, which 
has its roots in the 1950s, has passed through 
different stages and has been marked by the in-
volved actors. According to Pardo and Carva-
jal (2004, p. 158), five consecutive presidents 
had endeavored negotiation processes with the 
main Colombian guerrillas groups farc and 
eln4, all of them resulting in  strengthening 
of the insurgent groups. From 1980s, the 
wrongly named “paramilitary groups”5 were 
strengthened, while in 1990’s they acquired 
an articulate political discourse with the esta-
blishment of the auc6. Indeed, “in the last two 
decades of 20th century, armed illegal groups 
were increasing their presence in the territory, 
the number of fronts and members […] their 
consolidation was achieved through natural 
resources, legal (oil and gas) and illegal (coca 
and poppy). The war economies provided 
them with the means to finance their war 
strategies and plans”7 (Echandía, 2006, p. 11).
4 farc, if translated to English, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, while for eln, National Liberation 
Army.
5 The paramilitary groups are referred to as an official strategy of fighting insurgents by involving civilians; there-
fore, its applicability is not clear for the Colombian case. In fact, their counter-insurgent character is relativized by 
Echandía, as it indicates that their objective is related to the protection (expansion) of drug trafficking, and their 
presence in zones not operated by the guerrillas. See: Echandía (2006).
6 auc means United Self-defenses of Colombia.
7 Original in Spanish “En las últimas décadas del s. xx, los grupos alzados en armas incrementaron su presencia 
en el territorio del país y el número de frentes y los integrantes en sus filas […] lograron consolidar en torno a
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The Colombian official strategies for 
combating illegal armed groups have not been 
the same. Most significantly, whilst the Co-
lombian governmental strategies have mainly 
focused on combating guerrillas, the “para-
militarism/self-defense” phenomenon and 
its relation with violent dynamics were being 
postponed in the public debate on violence 
by official analyses of national security strate-
gies. In 2003 this situation seemed to change. 
During the first presidential period of Alvaro 
Uribe Velez, “paramilitarism” was recognized 
as source of violence, and its organizations as 
political actors. Hence, a negotiation process 
with the “paramilitary groups” was perceived 
as necessary, as were plans of disarming, de-
mobilization and reparation to victims.
The official Colombian anti-insurgency 
strategy has simultaneous and inseparably 
mixed domestic and international affairs, or 
what is called “intermestic issues” by Bayles 
(1997, p. 309). In the words of Pardo and 
Carvajal:
The Cuban revolution in 1959, the Sino-Soviet split 
in the early 1960s and the Sandinista victory in the 
1978 […] have some influence on the emergence of the 
Colombian insurgence […] as similarly do [:] the fsln 
defeat in the Nicaraguan presidential elections, the peace 
agreements in the Salvador, the ussr collapse and the 
Cuban economic crisis resulting from the dismantling 
of Soviet subsidies […] influenced guerrillas dynamics 
in the 1990s (Pardo & Carvajal 2004, p. 163)8.
Regarding the treatment of the internal 
conflict, the decision-making processes for 
each of the presidential administrations was 
framed differently. Specifically, the govern-
mental decision of internationalizing the 
conflict or keeping it in domestic arenas 
was strongly influenced by current historical 
international contexts. Between the 1960s 
and 1980s, the war against communism 
determined the international agenda for the 
Western Hemisphere. In the 1980s, drug 
trafficking was positioned as a collective ob-
jective which the international community 
was required to combat. Subsequently, in 
the 1990s, illegal drugs and humanitarian 
crises were in the sight of the international 
community. At the beginning of 21st cen-
tury, the war against international terrorism 
is the top issue in the international agenda. 
Consequently, in Colombia, and according 
to Pardo and Carvajal “since the first peace 
process in 1982, the successive presidential ad-
ministrations sought to prevent a ‘downward 
spiral’ in the domestic war that could stimu-
recursos naturales, tanto lícitos –oro y petróleo- como ilícitos –coca y amapola-, economías de guerra que les per-
mitieron contar con los medios para financiar sus estrategias y planes de guerra”.
8 Original in Spanish, “La revolución cubana de 1959, el rompimiento chino-soviético a comienzos de la década 
de los setenta y el triunfo de los sandinistas en Nicaragua en 1978 […] ejercieron alguna influencia en la creación 
de la insurgencia colombiana […] así como la derrota del fsln en las elecciones presidenciales nicaragüenses, los 
acuerdos de paz en El Salvador, el colapso de la urss y la crisis económica cubana tras el desmantelamiento de los 
subsidios soviéticos […] tuvieron influencia en la dinámica de los movimientos guerrilleros en la década de los 90”.
10
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late an external military intervention in the 
country”9 (Pardo & Carvajal, 2004, p. 169). 
Thus, as the authors pointed out, Colombia’s 
role and perspective in the Central American 
conflict resolution via Contadora10, made it 
possible to prevent a “Central-Americaniza-
tion” of the Colombian conflict.
It should be noted that in the 1980s, 
the governmental approaches to the inter-
nal conflict were separated from those used 
in combating drug trafficking, “based on a 
conviction according to which the guerrilla’s 
fight pursued policy objectives and not eco-
nomic benefits [but at the same time that] 
by accepting those links it might decrease 
the probability of concluding the internal 
conflict via negotiation”11 (Pardo & Carvajal, 
2004, p. 169). Indeed, since the second half 
of the 1990s the state decision of maintai-
ning the Colombian conflict internationally 
isolated changed. As a result of this shift, at 
the end of the decade the Colombian presi-
dent Pastrana (1998-2002), supported by 
many important actors representing different 
arenas and including legal cooperation and 
humanitarian mediations figures, facilitated 
favorable perspectives in the policy arena to 
start peace talks with the farc.
However, the strengthening of illegal 
groups and the positioning of drug traffick-
ing in their financing sources took place over 
the 1980s. An explosive combination of fac-
tors occurred in this context, among them: 
benefits of an interdependent and globalized 
economy, advances in communications, di-
versification of both drug trafficking markets 
and its stakeholders’ nature. In spite of such a 
combination, inside the attempts to explain 
the disappointing results of the peace process 
during the Pastrana administration, an im-
portant current of thought tended to draw at-
tention to a dysfunctional administrative and 
political management of the process. Through 
this current of thought, Colombian special-
ists, including Echandía, have addressed the 
relevance of the failure of negotiations of that 
period with the farc. The author suggested 
that the failure laid bare that:
[T]he farc [was] far from a final negotiation [...] from 
their political and ideological perspective […] they 
deeply mistrust the Colombian elites [while the farc] 
are betting for making the contradictions deeper [and 
they] consider that Colombia is not a democracy [.] 
Therefore their political participation or a legal opposi-
tion cannot be guaranteed [This guerilla] will insist on 
9 Original in Spanish “desde el primer proceso de paz en 1982, las sucesivas administraciones presidenciales 
buscaron evitar: empeorar la guerra doméstica y conducir a una intervención militar extranjera en el país”.
10 The Contadora was a diplomatic initiative founded in 1983 by the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, 
Panama and Venezuela. The initiative emerged to deal with the military conflicts in El Salvador, Nicaragua and 
Guatemala. Drawing international attention to those conflicts and pressured for a softening of the militarist stance 
of the usa in the region, the peace plan received the backing of a large amount of Latin American countries, the 
United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. See Roy (1999).
11 Original in Spanish “con base en la convicción de que la lucha guerrillera perseguía objetivos políticos y no la 
búsqueda de beneficios económicos [pero al mismo tiempo,] aceptar oficialmente dichos vínculos podía restringir 
la posibilidad de finalizar por vía negociada el conflicto interno”.
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confrontation which, according to their calculations, will 
increase their power until achieving a strategic balance 
with the state, in order to pave the way for negotiation 
(Echandía, 2006, p. 158)12.
This was the scenario that, surrounded 
by collective frustration, welcomed the 21st 
century, and fueled Colombian public opinion 
of preference for a military solution to defeat 
the farc. In contrast, the public debate on 
violence associated with “paramilitary groups” 
continued to be kept in hiatus. This is the sce-
nario, as were the international consequences 
of the events for September 11st 2001 (i.e., 
the global war against terrorism and a greater 
legitimacy for military means) that led to the 
election of Uribe Velez as president of the 
Republic in 2002. The Uribe Velez military 
strategy proposed as primary objective “to gain 
territorial control in the southeast part of the 
country by fighting the guerrilla’s fronts with 
historical presence there [, while] the guerril-
las intended to dilute the military efforts”13 
(Echandía, 2006, pp.158-159).
Nowadays, the presidency of Santos 
Calderon (2010-2014 and 2014-2018 peri-
ods), in conjunction with highly important 
military blows to the farc by the Colombian 
official forces, have opened the gate for nego-
tiations with the guerrillas. The Colombian 
state has officially recognized the current 
internal conflict, dealing with a great variety 
of actors, and formulating/implementing a 
multilevel public policy for the victims of 
the internal conflict, their reparation, and 
reconciliation, and truth-seeking.
Under this renewed scenario, it is impera-
tive to realize that “the Colombian internal 
conflict has had negative impacts on the ap-
proach to security policy [, the Colombian 
state approaches] have not [always] been 
shared by some countries in Europe and in 
the region, which has negatively affected the 
international insertion of Colombia in the 
world”14 (oasis, 2008, p. 20). Indeed, con-
tributing toward purposeful understandings 
of the Colombian internal conflict supports 
this academic exercise. To this end I will give 
a broader approach to: a) the rationale of ille-
gal armed groups and their financing sources, 
b) intervention, externalization strategies 
and collateral effects, c) the role of territorial 
proximity on the border zones.
12 Original in Spanish: “las farc [estaba] muy lejos de una negociación en firme […] desde su perspectiva polí-
tica e ideológica, esta guerrilla desconfía profundamente de la clase dirigente colombiana, [las farc] le apuesta a la 
profundización de las contradicciones […] considera que no existe democracia en Colombia [Esta guerrila] insistirá 
en la confrontación que, de acuerdo con sus cálculos, le permitirá aumentar su poder hasta alcanzar el equilibrio 
estratégico con el Estado para allanar el camino de la negociación”.
13 Original Spanish passage: “lograr el control territorial del suroriente del país combatiendo a los frentes guerri-
lleros que cuentan con una presencia histórica en esta región… [Mientras] la guerrilla pretende diluir el esfuerzo 
militar desplegado“.
14 Original in Spanish: ”el conflicto armado Colombiano ha tenido un impacto negativo sobre el enfoque que se 
le ha dado a la política de seguridad. Este enfoque no ha sido compartido por algunos países europeos y del vecin-
dario, lo que ha incidido negativamente en la inserción internacional “.
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the rationale of illegal armed groups and 
their financing sources
In the view of Echandía (2006), although 
natural resources ease the emergence of illegal 
armed groups, they themselves do not have 
sufficient explanatory power to understand 
the Colombian case. According to Echandía 
(2006), the armed confrontation in Colom-
bia has not been framed in a linear evolu-
tion; instead, there are successive strategic 
ruptures that originate changes in the actors´ 
modus operandi. Under careful mapping and 
analysis of the insurgent groups’ evolution in 
Colombia, Echandía (p. 249) found that “the 
guerrillas have launched strategies in which 
are recognized at least three purposes: achiev-
ing a high dispersion of the fronts, diversify-
ing sources of funding, and increasing local 
influence”15.
The sources of financing of illegal armed 
groups in Colombia have been nourished by 
drug trafficking, but also by other sources. 
Paraphrasing Echandia (2006), particularly 
since 1980s,the farc included cocaine as a 
financing source into their expansion strat-
egy. Additionally, there are incomes derived 
from controlling areas associated with live-
stock, commercial agriculture, farming and 
gold, and smuggling in bordering and coastal 
areas. Conversely, the strengthening of the 
eln is more associated with the extortion of 
the foreign oil companies responsible for the 
Caño-Limón-Covenas pipeline construction 
(Echandia, 2006). Indeed, these findings seem 
to be in line and give special validity to what 
Le Billion suggested:
[T]he motivation and funding of conflict is facilitated 
because primary commodities are often highly amenable 
to taxing and looting. This lootability arises in part from 
the fact that resources, and in particular extracted ones, 
are often easily accessible […] with minimal bureau-
cratic infrastructure […] the focus of military activities 
becomes centered on areas of economic significance. 
This has a critical effect on the location of conflicts […
while] complementing their traditional strategy of high 
mobility and location along international borders (Le 
Billion, 2001, p. 569).
The presence of resources and funding 
sources in the guerrillas´ areas of influence 
have been determined by their strategic be-
havior and territorial control. However, this 
is not due exclusively to an economic ratio-
nale. In fact,
The guerrilla’s presence and territorial expansion are not 
results of a random process, but strategic calculations 
based on political, military and economic concerns 
[…] the presence of these groups in many zones of the 
country was defined in advance (early 1980s) in their 
strategic plans, long time before they were aware about 
the economic potential of those zones [...] the guerrillas 
accomplished their expansion in the most important 
political and administrative centers of the country, and 
15 Original in Spanish: ”las guerrillas han puesto en marcha estrategias donde mínimo se reconocen 3 propósitos: 
lograr una alta dispersión de los frentes, diversificar sus fuentes de financiación y obtención de recursos y aumentar 
la influencia a nivel local”.
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developed armed activities in zones where oil, min-
ing, illicit crops, bordering and important agricultural 
activity were present (Echandia, 2006, pp. 28, 32)16.
Regarding the “paramilitaries” or self-
defense soldiers, it is unavoidable to empha-
size that in Colombia “the self-defense label is 
used for a wide range of armed organizations 
which want political treatment by the state, 
and justify their existence based on the guer-
rillas “harassment […] hiding their very true 
interests linked to organized crime [...] in cases 
of organizations created by drug traffickers in 
rural areas, the[ir] functions […] are clear”17 
(Echandía, 2006, p. 33). These deductions 
harmoniously combine with the perspective 
of Wood, for whom the war for commodities 
and other incomes make a negotiated settle-
ment to the conflict difficult, since the large 
flow of money produced during war are not 
invested in peace. Consequently, as “insur-
gents would have to assume the cost of sig-
nificant externalities […] The legalization of 
such income flows may thus be very difficult, 
and insurgents may prefer to maintain their 
wartime forms of control despite the costs of 
ongoing war” (Wood, 2001, p. 249).
From what has been said above, while 
the relationship between natural resources, 
funding sources, and the presence of illegal 
armed groups is evident in the Colombian 
conflict, the violence associated with territo-
rial control and armed confrontation indicates 
masked interests and rationales. Certainly, 
“conflict and violence have developed the 
highest intensity in the highest strategic areas, 
in which [:] the guerrillas seek to maintain 
their presence […] the paramilitaries and 
criminal gangs have the intention of banish-
ing them, and the Colombian public security 
forces deploy their action [in order] to regain 
control over these territories”18 (Echandía, 
2006 and see the 2-5 Annexes). As a tragic 
consequence, the internal conflict actors have 
been using forced displacement as a strategic 
tactic and have produced dramatic results. As 
the National Center for Historical Memory 
of Colombia asserts (2013), there have been 
16 Original in Spanish: “la presencia y expansión territorial de los grupos guerrilleros no es el resultado de un 
proceso aleatorio, sino de un cálculo estratégico en función de consideraciones políticas, militares y económicas 
[…] la presencia de estos grupos en muchas zonas del país se encontraba contemplada en los planes estratégicos 
definidos por las organizaciones hacia comienzos de los 80’s, […] la guerrilla logró extenderse a los centros político-
administrativos más importantes del país y desarrollar actividades armadas en zonas petroleras, mineras de cultivos 
ilícitos, fronterizas y con importante actividad agropecuaria”.
17 Original in Spanish: “con el nombre de autodefensa se presenta una variada gama de organizaciones armadas, 
que buscan un tratamiento político por parte del Estado o justifican su existencia en razón del hostigamiento de la 
guerrilla para encubrir en muchos casos sus verdaderos intereses ligados al crimen organizado… en el caso de las 
organizaciones creadas a nivel rural por narcotraficantes, es claro que cumplen con otras funciones”.
18 Original in Spanish: “el conflicto y la violencia, han registrado la mayor intensidad en las zonas que poseen 
un alto valor estratégico; en estas, las guerrillas buscan mantener su presencia ante el firme propósito de las auto-
defensas y bandas criminales de desterrarlas, mientras que la fuerza pública colombiana despliega su acción contra 
los grupos ilegales, para recuperar el control sobre estos territorios”.
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5,712,506 forced displacements (1985-2012), 
177,307 civil deaths (1958-2012), 27,023 
kidnappings (1970-2010), 25077 forced 
disappearances (1985-2012), 10,189 victims 
of anti-personnel mines (1985 – 2012), and 
1,982 mass murders (1980-2012).
the presence of intervention 
And externALizAtion strAtegies, 
coLLAterAL effects And trAns-
border ALLiAnces
There have been different types of re-
sponses arising from different arenas of 
research in an attempt to clarify in which 
circumstances civil wars tend to lead to in-
ternational disputes. One of the possible re-
sponses arises from an analysis of more than 
400 militarized international disputes (mid) 
which coincided with civil wars. In their study, 
Gleditsch et al. (2008) found that those mid 
are often related to civil war issues, but also 
characterized by strategies of intervention 
and externalization and unintended spill-
over effects from internal conflict (collateral 
effects). Indeed, the authors underline that 
“the increased risk of interstate conflict as-
sociated with civil wars is primarily driven 
by states’ efforts to affect the outcome of the 
civil war through strategies of intervention 
and externalization and not by an increase 
in conflicts over unrelated issues” (Gleditsch 
et al., 2008, p. 478).
State interventions in civil wars have dif-
ferent forms such as interstate military action, 
delegating part of their conflict behavior to 
foreign rivals of the rebel organizations and 
using rebel patronage (Gleditsch et al., 2008). 
It should be noted that rebel patronage has 
been increasingly favored since “rebels can 
provide information and expertise about the 
local population and terrain that states lack 
and can serve a legitimizing role by giving a 
domestic ´face´ to the operation” (Gleditsch 
et al., 2008, p. 485). In the Colombian con-
flict, these forms of intervention might be 
identified for the farc group, so that trans-
bordering alliances have appeared in different 
stages of the conflict, as long as international 
assistance has been received by them from 
different sources. This leads to complex conse-
quences, as long as international stakeholders 
of drug trafficking are involved.
Although direct interventions of foreign 
states are challenging to establish, events 
have occurred which put forward the in-
volvement of senior officials from foreign 
states and their links with Colombian illegal 
groups. The data on Raul Reyes´s computer 
(second in command of the farc), seized in 
the military operation that transgressed the 
Ecuadorian border in 2008, is illustrative. In 
the computer, and according to what has been 
reported by the Colombian media, the farc 
have woven international relations with thirty 
countries, including: Brazil, Bolivia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Peru, Venezuela, and other Latin American 
countries, as well as countries in Europe and 
Asia. Concerning the neighboring countries 
(marine and territorial), it was found that:
Nicaragua […] official aid poured by different sectors of 
the Nicaraguan government [...] protection and asylum 
to farc members [...] weapons delivery […] Costa Rica, 
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the presence of large number of farc members in that 
country [...] the Costa Rican public prosecutor office is 
investigating [...] the farc links with prominent politi-
cians, entrepreneurs, and unionists…[p]roperties and 
‘businesses’ of the guerrillas were detected […] Panama 
[...] territory has been used to hold meetings in order to 
collect and launder money key links [and were detected] 
[...] for smuggling weapons into Colombia […] Venezu-
ela [...] for years, government sectors have delivered cash 
and weapons to the farc […] for instance, the director 
of Military Intelligence and the Disip (political police) 
guerrilla camps in the country [... have been found…] 
Ecuador […]’Non-aggression pacts’ between the farc 
and the Ecuadorian government, as was written in an 
email by a guerrilla leader [...] selling weapons and ex-
plosives […] Peru [...] the presence of farc members 
in that country... assistance to the guerrilla factions in 
Peru...] dissents of Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Move-
ment (mrta) and the Revolutionary Left Movement 
(mir)....the farc used to use Iquitos as a quarry for 
militants, weapons, drug trafficking and as a place for 
recovering... in 2002, the farc met [...] with members 
of the Shining Path [movement…] Bolivia [...] links 
between the farc and the peasant leader Felipe Quispe 
… the presence of guerrillas in Bolivia with the purpose 
of doing political indoctrination [but also] Bolivians 
were militarily trained in Colombia […] Brazil [...] 
money has been donated to the farc by leftist groups 
and unions [...] the guerrillas´ nexus with Brazilian and 
Colombian drug traffickers (Semana Review, 2009)19.
In the meantime, the perception of Co-
lombia as a threat for regional security has 
been taking hold since the internal conflict 
has given rise to unintended spillover effects 
with domestic, but also international, cover-
age. This characteristic has been pointed out 
by Gleditsch et al (2008) as involved in the 
occurrence of interstate military conflicts. 
The unintended spillover effects in the Co-
lombian case are colossal, “about 35 thousand 
Colombians have been forcibly displaced to 
Ecuador [... ] where more than 50 soldiers 
and policemen have been killed by Colom-
bian guerrillas, nearly 2 million Colombians 
are living in Venezuela where they have been 
increasing in numbers, in the border areas 
kidnapping, extortion and theft of vehicles 
and livestock have taken place [.] The guer-
rillas and the paramilitaries have been doing 
incursions in Panama, Brazil and Peru, with 
the purpose of supplying and training their 
troops”20 (Pardo & Carvajal, 2004, p. 156).
These facts corroborate the Gleditsch 
et al. (2004, p. 480) finding, “States experi-
encing civil war may externalize the conflict, 
directing military force outward to retaliate 
against others for supporting rebels and/or 
to conduct cross-border counterinsurgency 
operations […] the fighting associated with 
civil wars can create unintended security spill-
19 The underlined text in the quotation was added by the author in order to highlight the countries. See the 
original article (Spanish) in the Annex 6, at the end of this paper (Semana Review, 2009).
20 Original in Spanish: “alrededor de 35 mil colombianos han sido desplazados hacia Ecuador más de 50 militares 
y policías han sido asesinados por miembros de la guerrilla colombiana, casi 2 millones de colombianos residen en 
Venezuela en donde se vienen incrementando, en la zona fronteriza, los secuestro, extorción y robo de vehículos y 
ganado; en Panamá, Brasil y Perú se han dado incursiones guerrilleras y paramilitares colombianas, cuyo propósito 
es abastecer y entrenar a sus tropas ”.
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overs that give rise to interstate tension”. This 
finding helps to understand the Patriot Plan 
rationale during Uribe Velez´s presidency, 
through which seven high mountain battal-
ions and twenty-seven mobile brigades cut 
the strategic mobility corridors of the farc, 
isolating them in border areas with Brazil, 
Ecuador and Venezuela (Instituto de Asuntos 
Geoestratégicos y Asuntos Políticos, 2010, p. 
6). At the end of 2009, the Colombian armed 
confrontation scenario,
covers peripheral […] particularly near borders areas 
with neighboring countries […] Among the twelve 
neighboring departments […] three (Guainía, Vaupés 
and Boyaca ]departments] increased the number of 
combats in the period from 2008 to 2009 […] irregu-
lar groups increased their armed actions significantly 
in eight departments […] Nariño [department] in the 
border with Ecuador ranked first in the five depart-
ments with most armed activity, followed by Norte de 
Santander and Arauca [departments] bordering Ven-
ezuela; Putumayo [department] bordering Ecuador and 
Peru; and Choco [department] which borders Panama21 
(Echandía et al., 2010, pp. 148, 165).
Complementarily “the actions of the farc 
in border areas increased by 80.12% between 
the Pastrana [1998-2002] and Uribe Periods, 
while the actions of the eln [guerrilla] in the 
border areas were reduced by 55,2%”22 (Ca-
brera, 2009, p.189). However, paraphrasing 
Cabrera, Uribe’s government underestimated 
the presence of illegal armed groups in these 
strategic areas, while some literature indi-
cates that the rebels’ presence in the border 
areas helps to prolong the conflict and causes 
negative externalities for the region (See An-
nexes 7-10).
In addition to this scenario, another 
ingredient showed up: “the confrontation 
claims […], the increase of both fumiga-
tions and manual eradication of illicit crops 
[an issue of tension between Ecuador and 
Colombia] increased the resistance against 
the security strategy from neighboring au-
thorities”23 (Ramirez, 2006, p.66). Evidently, 
the careless Colombian fumigations, and its 
toxicity, caused important collateral effects in 
Ecuador borderlands, causing Ecuador to sue 
Colombia in the International Court of Justice 
21 Original in Spanish: “el escenario actual de la confrontación armada comprende regiones periféricas y aparta-
das de la geografía nacional, en particular zonas próximas a las fronteras con los países vecinos […] Entre los doce 
departamentos limítrofes34, únicamente en tres(Guainía, Vaupés y Boyacá) aumentó el número de combates de 
2008 a 2009. […] las acciones armadas de los grupos irregulares aumentaron de forma significativa en ocho de los 
doce departamentos fronterizos35. Entre los cinco con mayor actividad armada en 2009, Nariño, en la frontera 
con Ecuador, ocupa el primer lugar; seguido de Norte de Santander y Arauca, limítrofes con Venezuela; Putumayo, 
en límites con Ecuador y Perú; y Chocó, que limita con Panamá”.
22 Original in Spanish: “ las acciones de las farc en las zonas fronterizas incrementaron 80,12% entre los periodos 
de Pastrana y Uribe [1998-2002], mientras que las acciones del eln se disminuyeron 55,2% en las zonas  fronterizas”.
23 Original in Spanish :“las exigencias de la misma confrontación, y ha incrementado las fumigaciones y la erra-
dicación manual de cultivos ilícitos [un asunto de tensión entre Colombia y Ecuadro, incrementó…] la resistencia 
existente entre los gobernantes vecinos a su estrategia de seguridad”.
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(2008), declaring Colombia’s air fumigation 
a violation of Ecuador’s sovereignty.
Moreover, the unintended spillover ef-
fects from the Colombian internal conflict 
relativized the state borders. One reason is 
related to the simultaneous and attached 
nature of regional-global phenomena that 
are strongly affecting Colombia. Seen from 
the national security angle, they represent 
a threat to Colombia. Speaking explicitly, 
“money laundering carried out by the Co-
lombian armed groups in Peru, Ecuador and 
Bolivia, the weaponry delivery to the illegal 
organizations in which Venezuela, Paraguay, 
Peru and Brazil are involved; the illegal trade 
of weapons and chemicals [used in drug traf-
ficking] which have to do with Europe and 
the United States of America, as well the il-
legal drugs consumption and their demand 
worldwide”24 (Pardo & Carvajal, 2004, pp. 
156,157). By gathering the pieces of the in-
ternal conflict, the impact of implementing 
traditional and punitive perspectives on drugs 
supply gets much more complex and gives 
rise to more doubts about the effectiveness 
of the global war on drugs. Since then, the 
business’ profitability has increased, but also 
the financial capability of the internal conflict 
actors and the unintended spillover effects 
from the Colombian internal conflict. In 
fact, during Santos’ presidency, Colombia has 
played a leading role in promoting a regional 
and global debate on the war on drugs. Santos 
calls for recognition that between total war 
and legalization there exists a broad range of 
options worth exploring if one were to seek 
to take better care of drug consumers, pro-
tect the youth from drug abuse, collaborate 
to continue combating organized crime and 
provide alternative economic means to illegal 
crop farmers and vulnerable communities. 
This position was firstly presented
In 2012 during the Summit of the Americas in Carta-
gena, where the heads of state of the western hemisphere 
agreed to establish a mandate for the Organization of 
American States (oas) to produce a report on options 
for refocusing the regional approach on drugs control. 
In 2013 the oas concluded the analysis and presented 
its report to the region. Since then, the report has been 
debated all across the Americas and has influenced public 
policy changes and adjustments in various countries, 
including Colombia […] Colombia, Mexico and Guate-
mala lobbied to hold the 2016 general assembly special 
session, known as ungass, to seek a more “humane solu-
tion” to the drugs problem that goes beyond a focus on 
enforcement and criminalization (The Guardian, 2016).
However, the relationship between civil 
wars and militarized international disputes 
requires careful attention in analyzing the 
Colombian conflict, especially if the increased 
risk of interstate conflict is primary driven 
by states’ efforts to affect the outcome of the 
24 Original in Spanish: “ las actividades de lavado de activos realizadas por los grupos armados colombianos en 
Perú, Ecuador y Bolivia, el suministro de armas a grupos ilegales colombianos en los que han estado relacionados 
Venezuela, Paraguay, Perú y Brasil; el comercio ilegal de armas e insumos químicos[usados en el narcotráfico] rea-
lizado desde Europa y Estados Unidos, así como el consumo de estupefacientes alrededor del mundo”.
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civil war, as was demonstrated by Gletisch 
and his colleagues. In the Colombian case, 
the conflictive nature of the relationship with 
neighboring states deserves to be followed by 
a strategic analysis in order to avoid taking 
this risk as a minor factor, but also to encour-
age the presidents in the region to see that 
this factor is not a game since it tends to lead 
to international disputes, as has occurred for 
400 mid. Equally important is following the 
position on the Colombian peace process of 
states in the region to prevent any support, 
attempt or idea of intervention in the Co-
lombian conflict. Therefore, maintaining the 
neighboring states’ support for the Colombian 
peace process is crucial, as is turning the highly 
strained relationships between states into low-
level conflictive or competitive/friendly ones. 
Pursuing those challenges requires solving 
common problems, i.e. money laundering, 
weaponry delivery to illegal and criminal orga-
nizations, illegal trade of weapons, chemicals 
and oil; but also dealing with the low human 
development in the Colombian border areas 
with its neighbors, i.e., effectively fighting 
poverty and increasing opportunities for 
working and studying. Indeed, the combina-
tion of the mentioned means seems to decrease 
the risk explained by Gletisch.
Complementary, and drawing on why 
foreign states would decide to support rebel 
groups in an internal conflict, Gletisch et al. 
(2004, pp. 484-485) identified five reasons: 
a) Proxy wars, b) Regime disputes, c) Irreden-
tism d) Protection of ethnic kin, e) Tit-for-tat. 
Some of them are especially interesting to 
study in the Colombian case, but not all of 
them are applicable; for instance the reasons 
of protection of ethnic kin and irredentism 
are not applicable in the Colombian con-
flict. Conversely, the regime disputes reason 
requires responsible handling, particularly if 
ideological empathy between rebel groups 
and neighboring states appears in the con-
text; also the mistreatment of Colombian 
migrants appears as a governmental strategy. 
Indeed, the ongoing diplomatic tension be-
tween Venezuela and Colombia promoted by 
Nicolas Maduro´s decision of closing the bor-
der zone accompanied by forcing more than 
1,000 Colombian migrants to leave Venezuela 
(El Espectador, 2015) should encourage an 
elaboration on the means used by the Venezu-
elan government to resolve internal political 
crises; i.e., discursively using the Colombian 
conflict and the stigmatization of Colombi-
ans as collaborators of paramilitary groups as 
an important cause of the Venezuelan crisis.
Additionally, it is particularly important 
to consider regional contexts in which policy 
transitions in neighboring countries have been 
taking place over the last part of 1990s and 
the beginning of 21st century. According to 
Hengre et al (2001) empirical analysis, based 
on data from 152 countries in the period 
1816–1992, linked levels of democracy and 
regime change, while exploring the implica-
tions of the direction and magnitude of politi-
cal change, indeed “regime change leads to a 
heightened risk of civil war in the short run 
[…] consistent democracies and stark autoc-
racies are equally unlikely to experience civil 
war. An intermediate regime is estimated to 
be four times more prone to civil war than a 
consistent democracy” (Hegre et al., 2001, pp. 
35,38). Taking these authors’ standpoints into 
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account in order to analyze Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela, remains an inter-
esting avenue for future research since these 
countries have recently passed through regime 
transitions. It should be noted that it does not 
mean that the current transitional changes in 
the neighboring countries are linked and/or 
affecting the Colombian conflict dynamic. 
Instead, analyzing the mentioned countries’ 
cases from Hegre et al lenses could academi-
cally allow us to elaborate on the meaning of 
democracies, anocracies or semi-democracies 
and stark autocracies, and their applicability 
in the neighborhood.
the roLe of territoriAL proximity in 
unsoLved border disputes contexts
Within the literature on interstate con-
flicts, the roles of territory and geography in 
the occurrence of this type of conflict have 
captured the attention of conflict scholars, 
giving rise two major perspectives: the first 
set of perspectives views territory as a “source 
of conflict”, while the second views territory 
as a “facilitating condition for conflict”. For 
instance, Hensel (2000) suggests that conflict 
is more likely between neighboring states in 
circumstances of territorial controversies, 
while it is less likely between states with 
such a dispute but distant from each other. 
Therefore, territory is significant to the extent 
that it contributes to proximity between the 
states, i.e., proximity facilitates force projec-
tion capabilities, threat perception, but also 
interaction opportunities (Hensel, 2000, p. 
5). In fact, Hensel found that:
over half of all militarized disputes between 1816-1992 
and two-thirds of all full- scale interstate wars in this 
period began between at least two contiguous adver-
saries, where contiguity is measured by the existence 
of a direct land or river border between two states […] 
over half of all militarized disputes and almost every 
full-scale war in the 1945-1992 period began between 
at least one pair of contiguous adversaries [Indeed,] 
competing claims to 71 distinct pieces of territory [took 
place] in the Western Hemisphere (North, Central, and 
South America and the Caribbean) between 1816-1996 
(Hensel, 2000, p. 8).
In line with this approach, Hensel, 
Vasquez and Valeriano (2008) established that 
between 1816 and 1997, the wars between 
neighboring countries represent 54% of the 
total wars initiated by states. Furthermore, 
the authors proposed a scientific typology 
and classification for all interstate wars from 
1816-1997; and a classification for the inter-
state causes, showing three types of causes: 
a) territorial disputes, b) policy wars and c) 
political regime change. On the topic of ter-
ritorial disputes, the authors specified “two 
neighbors have a higher probability of going to 
war than any other two states if their borders 
have not been mutually accepted” (Vasquez & 
Valeriano, 2008, p. 9). However, by grasping 
how the later findings can be applied to the 
Colombian conflict, it can be found that the 
relationship between Ecuador and Colombia 
represents an important case in which to test 
Vasquez and Valeriano arguments. In fact, 
Colombia and Ecuador maintain strained 
relationships and they have defined territorial 
borders; therefore, the probability of war in 
this case would not be related to the mutu-
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ally accepted borders factor. In addition, the 
relationships between Colombia and Brazil or 
Peru are also illustrative, since their territo-
rial proximity and political distance have not 
necessarily led to strained relationships and/
or to warnings of increases of interstate war. 
As a result, the territorial disputes, territorial 
proximity and political distance factors are 
applicable in certain cases. Further attention 
to the mentioned cases would argument in-
sight into the applicability of those factors in 
both contemporary conflicts, i.e., interstate 
and intrastate.
The previous findings stress the impor-
tance of the foreign policy mandate regarding 
collaborative bilateral relations with neigh-
boring countries. Fortunately, this is in line 
with the current Colombian foreign policy 
approach toward deepening of collaborative 
relations with: a) territorial neighbors: Brazil, 
Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, b) Ca-
ribbean sea neighbors: Dominican Republic, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa 
Rica, Panama and Venezuela, and c) Pacific 
ocean neighbors: Costa Rica, Panama, and 
Ecuador. In addition, the previous emphasis 
lead to taking approaches which include both 
conflict prevention perspectives and coopera-
tive interactions, given that:
[C]onflict is most likely when the expected utility of 
conflict is greatest that is, in the middle, where states 
have both the opportunity and willingness to engage 
in conflict […] Proximity both creates such possibili-
ties and raises their probabilities (and also raises the 
probability of cooperative interactions under the right 
circumstances) (Harr, 2005, p. 397).
If there is still doubt about these perspec-
tives, at minimum it cannot be ignored that 
“territory [has] ‘a psychological importance 
for nations that is quite out of proportion 
to its intrinsic value, strategic or economic’, 
and territorial disputes are seen as arousing 
sentiments of pride and honor more rapidly 
and more intensely than any other type of is-
sue […] because of their tangible, intangible, 
and/or reputational importance” (Hensel, 
2000, pp. 5-4).
As discussed above, continuous analyzing 
and actualizing knowledge about contigu-
ous states are essential for interstate conflict 
prevention, but also for identifying shared 
interstate opportunities. This is particularly 
determinant for non-settled territorial border-
ing disputes in which stained relationships 
with distancing in mutual understanding 
terms between the states appear. In the Co-
lombian case, it applies to Nicaragua25 and 
25 The Esguerra - Bárcenas Treaty was signed between Colombia and Nicaragua in 1928, in which Nicaragua 
recognized Colombia’s sovereignty over the San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina archipelagos, while Co-
lombia recognized Nicaragua´s sovereignty over the Mosquitos Coast and the islands Mangle Grande and Mangle 
Chico. In 2001, Nicaragua presented their formal complaint to the International Court of Justice (icj), claiming 
their sovereignty over the east of longitude 82, including the archipelago of San Andrés. In 2007, the icj recognized 
the full sovereignty of Colombia over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, but questioned 
the demarcation of the maritime boundary in the meridian 82. In 2012, the icj ruling was to grant Colombia 
full access to the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone corresponding to the main archipelago of San
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Venezuela26. Likewise, those states that have 
not signed a territorial settlement treaty, i.e., 
Honduras27 and Costa Rica28 with whom 
Colombia maintains harmonious relation-
ships, should not be forgotten regardless of 
the current decreased risk of interstate conflict.
It is also argued that proximity is multi-
dimensional, since it is linked to the distance 
that exists between social unit-states, and 
distance in turn can be measured in terms of 
“physical and psychological distances - tech-
nological and strategic, intellectual and legal, 
social and political, psychic and expectancy, 
and policy distances” (Starr, 2005, p. 390). 
Indeed, an alternative perspective is raised by 
Wrigth who suggests that the probability of 
war increases with increases of the distance 
–not proximity– in mutual understanding 
terms, between the states. In other words, 
war takes place when the powers are distanced 
from each other and a basis of understanding 
is absent. Exemplifying cooperation initiatives 
in which Colombia has been participating, 
handling the spillover effects of the internal 
conflict while facing multifactorial tensions 
that hamper relationships in the region, the 
following initiatives should be emphasized: 
the joint military base in Panama, the Bina-
tional Plan between Colombia and Ecuador, 
the Center against Smuggling coordinated 
with Venezuela, and the Brazilian Surveillance 
System of the Amazon (Sivam).
From the later approach angle, the re-
newed scope assumed by the Santos Calderon 
presidency is a tremendous challenge, i.e., 
continuously rebuilding and re-signifying the 
distanced perceptions between Colombia and 
the neighboring countries.
Andres, Providencia and Santa Catalina, plus 12-mile enclaves around the smaller islands, which, quite literally 
might now become islands within Nicaragua’s ocean. Despite this ruling, there is still a discrepancy. See: http://
www.sogeocol.edu.co/Ova/fronteras_colombia/fronteras/caribe/caribe_nicaragua.html and http://www.nicaragua-
dispatch.com/news/2012/11/nicaragua-celebrates-world-court-ruling/6067
26 The dispute refers to the possession of the Monks Islets and the delimitation of marine areas on Coquibacoa 
Gulf. In 1941 a treaty on territorial border demarcation was signed in Bogota city. In 1952 the Colombian Foreign 
Minister Juan Uribe Holguín, gave to Venezuela the Monks Islets through a note, while disowning the 3rd Article 
of the Colombian Constitution which establishes that borders can be changed only by a treaty or agreement ap-
proved by the Congress of the Republic. From 1954 direct negotiations began between the two governments in 
order to reach an agreement on the delimitation of marine and submarine areas. In 1958, the first United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea established the matter of marking shared waters. Colombia welcomed to this 
agreement, but Venezuela did not. 
27 The López Ramírez - Ocampo Contreras Treaty establishes marine and submarine areas. It was signed in 1986, 
has not yet been approved by neither the Congress of Colombia nor the Congress of Honduras. The border between 
Colombia and Honduras begins on the 82 meridian’s intersection with the parallel 14 58 ‘00 “. See: http://www.
sogeocol.edu.co/Ova/fronteras_colombia/fronteras/caribe/caribe_honduras.html
28 The Fernández - Facio Treaty “on delimitation of Marine and Submarine Areas and Maritime Cooperation in 
the Caribbean Sea” was signed in 1977. It was approved by the Colombian Congress of Colombia in 1978, but the 
Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica has not. See: http://www.sogeocol.edu.co/Ova/fronteras_colombia/fronteras/
caribe/caribe_costarica.html>
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gAthering the pieces: Addressing 
the Links
As is now well documented, different 
elements associated to dynamics surrounding 
the internal conflict have been involved in the 
Colombian internal conflict, which accord-
ing to findings of international and national 
studies on conflict increases the likelihood of 
international disputes occurrences and the 
risk of escalation of both types of conflicts. 
Elements have involved intervention and ex-
ternalization strategies, unexpected spillover 
effects of the internal conflict, contiguity and 
unsolved border disputes between neighbor-
ing states, long periods of a distanced basis 
for mutual understanding between contiguous 
states, the use and abuse of bordering zones 
by Colombian armed illegal groups and their 
allies in other countries, but also events of the 
alleged incursions of Venezuelan Bolivarian 
National Armed Forces in Colombian terri-
tory have been investigated by the Colombian 
government.
Each of the involved elements is a puz-
zling issue itself, consequently, when combin-
ing the real issues at stake (nature, meaning) 
they get more complex. Moreover, the simul-
taneous appearance of these elements increases 
the likelihood of interstate disputes in the 
region, due to the greater explanatory power 
of certain variables when understanding how 
an internal conflict may turn into an interstate 
conflict. In the Colombian case, the increased 
risk of intestate conflict is accompanied by 
powerful factors: a) the unexpected spillover 
effects of the internal conflict which derives 
in unsolved common problems and negatively 
affects national interests and/or the wellbeing 
of the citizens in the border areas, b) the con-
tiguity and unsolved border disputes between 
neighboring states who have a distanced basis 
for mutual understanding based on distanc-
ing, and c) the use and abuse of bordering 
areas by Colombian armed illegal/criminal 
groups and their allies in other countries. 
The later factor represents a key issue during 
the Colombian post-conflict stage, due to 
the interests at stake. For example, profitable 
enterprises of crime and their well-rooted 
businesses in the globalized world will simul-
taneously be confronted by the willingness 
of the farc and eln demobilized members, 
and nourished by those who continue in the 
business such as criminal gangs, their terri-
torial power protection and their links with 
other criminal groups within the American 
continent and abroad. Furthermore, the evo-
lution of security performance in the border 
areas between Colombia and its neighbors 
might still face obstacles after the demobi-
lization of the farc provided the legacies of 
their activities, the presence of the eln and 
criminal gangs. According to Valenzuela (as 
cited in Rosario University, 2015), one of the 
post-conflict challenges in Colombia is found 
in military and security fields, as there are 
many difficulties in weapons dereliction and 
reintegration processes. Indeed, Valenzuela 
argues that different scenarios which hamper 
those processes arise, among them: a) the 
possibility that not all guerrillas’ armament 
may be delivered, b) guerrilla factions will 
remain in the mountains, c) criminal groups 
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will be created, d) the possibility that not all 
farc members will be demobilized (Rosario 
University, 2015).
For those reasons, realizing the post-con-
flict scenarios, their magnitude and challenges 
in the current regional context is more than 
pertinent, as is the importance of an uninter-
rupted encouraging of mutual understanding 
between the states, since they all have been 
affected in different degrees. The neighboring 
countries have been affected by collateral ef-
fects of the internal conflict, while Colombia 
has been affected by phenomena occurring in 
the neighboring countries which have impact 
on the dynamics generated by the Colombian 
illegal armed groups. Seen from this bifocal 
lens, with the intermestic nature of the in-
ternal conflict within interlocking domestic-
international arenas, one becomes aware that 
“civil wars are central to the motivations and 
strategies behind international disputes […] 
civil wars provide new sources of interstate 
tension, and support for rebel organizations 
can complement or substitute for the direct 
use of force between states” (Gleditsch et al., 
2008, p. 502).
As stressed in my introduction, the aim 
of this paper is in part achieved, but it is still 
under construction since going further and 
identifying shared challenges in the region 
is required. Since identifying the common 
points and shared regional challenges are key 
goals in the middle of proxy distances between 
states, one of the common issues and regional 
challenges is represented in the negotiated 
settlement of the Colombian internal conflict.
The following section examines current 
status of the Colombian peace process and 
goes further by proposing its resolution as a 
shared regional issue while other related issues 
are involved and deserve responsible handling.
the current peAce process,  
A historicAL opportunity At LocAL, 
nAtionAL And regionAL LeveLs
In an ongoing peace process which start-
ed at the end of 2012, despite the hope that 
arises from the new chance for peace, it is 
important to keep in mind that civil wars 
rarely end in negotiated settlements. Accord-
ing to Walter (1997), 20% percent of civil 
wars were resolved at the bargaining table 
between 1940 and 1990. Additionally, Fisas 
(2014) asserts that 80% of the 54 conflicts 
that ended in the last thirty years were pos-
sible through a peace agreement while 20% 
ended with military victory. The fact that civil 
wars tend to end on the battle field poses a 
startling empirical puzzle for the stakehold-
ers and actors which are called upon to be a 
part of the Colombian peace process. The 
point here is not to argue blindly in favor or 
against the process by avoiding the issues and 
dynamics at stake, nor the international cases 
learnings or failures; but simply to point out 
that the current process presents a big step 
toward peaceful local, national and regional 
futures. The role of international collabora-
tion is illustrative, indeed, “for groups fighting 
civil wars almost always chose to fight to the 
finish unless an outside power stepped in to 
guarantee a peace agreement. If a third party 
agreed to enforce the terms of a peace treaty, 
negotiations always succeeded regardless of 
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the initial goals, ideology, or ethnicity of the 
participants” (Walter, 1997, p. 334). This 
raises a series of challenges for preventing 
the latent risk of interstate disputes in the 
South American region, and the importance 
of supporting the current Colombian peace 
process and the resolution of the conflict. In 
order to contribute to understanding some of 
the current challenges at stake, I will broadly 
zoom in on the current peace process and the 
shift it represents toward regional constructive 
approaches. I will then attempt to suggest a 
possible approach on the state as a multilevel 
couch for social change regarding the internal 
conflict resolution.
overview of the current colombian peace 
process (2012-?)
After five decades of internal conflict, the 
failed previous negotiations and attempts to 
defeat the farc and the eln guerrillas, a politi-
cal solution was finally advanced by the presi-
dent of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos. The 
formal peace talks with the farc were opened 
in Oslo in October 2012 and continued in 
Havana, Cuba. Talks began without a cease-
fire, however a unilateral ceasefire was declared 
by the farc in 2015 while the government 
agreed to suspend Airforce strikes. Currently, 
the representativeness of the delegates at the 
negotiation table brings hope in the historic 
and complex responsibility to strike a deal 
toward a sustainable peace.
The government negotiating team29 in-
cludes representatives from the private sector, 
the official military forces, politicians and 
government delegates. In comparison with 
previous Colombian peace processes, the 
current scenario seems to be favorable for 
achieving a peace agreement, since there ap-
pears a mixture of elements that together make 
a shift toward a political settlement. Among 
the elements, quoted by the International 
Crisis Group (2012), are: a) the skepticism 
toward the guerrillas remains widespread, 
b) the security forces are better aligned with 
the civilian leadership and represented at the 
negotiation table than in the past, d) with 
neither side likely to win by arms alone, both 
have shown a strong incentive to negotiate, e) 
the farc are militarily weakened and perceive 
29 The government negotiating team members: Humberto de la Calle, who is the coordinator and moderator 
of the negotiating team, Jorge Enrique Mora Rangel, a retired General of the Army Forces of Colombia, Oscar 
Naranjo, ex-National Police General chief, María Paulina Riveros, Human Rights Chief at the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, and both Sergio Jaramillo (High Commissioner for Peace) and Frank Pearl (Commissioner for Peace) are 
the direct representatives of the president in the peace process with the farc. On the other hand, in the farc ne-
gotiations Commission are participating: Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri called “Timochenco” Commander in Chief 
of the Central command, Luciano Marín Arango called “Ivan Marquez” Spokesman and Commander of the Cen-
tral High Command, “Andres Paris” high-ranking chief of the Eastern Bloc of the Farc and ex-negotiator during 
the peace process under Pastrana´s administration, Marco Leon Calarca spokesperson of the farc and counselor 
member of the Central High Command, “Ricardo Granda” international spokesman of the farc, and the so-called 
sergeant Pascuas, one of the farc founders in 1964. It is worth noting that this is the first time for Colombia that 
representatives of the official armed forces are included at the negotiation table. See Semana Review (2012).
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the current opportunity for participating in 
peace building as a means to participate in 
political arenas, f ) the Colombian govern-
ment maneuvers from a position of strength 
due to the military advantage, while the trust-
building is accompanied by advances in public 
social policies toward equity and equality, 
g) the rights of victims are being taken into 
account, as Santos’ administration has rec-
ognized the state’s responsibility in some key 
human rights violations, but has also started 
to tackle problems directly concerning the 
guerrillas, such as rural development. Another 
key factor should be added, h) the active par-
ticipation and endorsement of civil society, 
notably coming from rural and indigenous 
communities have been significantly stronger 
than for previous peace processes.
The peace process has been accompa-
nied by advances in the domestic sphere; for 
instance, the adoption of the Victims and 
Land Restitution Law. In addition to this 
national achievement, and as asserted by the 
Colombian Vice-President in the Colombian 
report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review:
[F]or the first time the ethnic minorities were consulted 
on three instruments that guaranteed their rights: The 
National Development Plan, the National Guarantee 
Program and the legislation regarding reparation and 
land restitution… The security effort in the last decade 
had transformed the country […] 87% of the munici-
palities, comprising 86% of the population, had not 
suffered a single act of terrorism in 2012 […] the core 
of the transitional justice system in Colombia was the 
rights of victims and the rights to truth, justice and 
reparation […] a Victims Reparation Unit, a Land 
Restitution Unit and a Center for Historical Memory 
had been established (un General Assembly, 2013).
Inside this transformed context, and 
with the help of Norway and Cuba and the 
participation of Venezuela and Chile as ob-
servers, president Santos initiated the dialogue 
with the farc. The peace process has been 
designed for taking as a flexible guide three 
stages (Semana Review, 2012). The first stage 
took place between February and August, 
2012, in Cuba, where there was a common 
agenda to end the conflict. The second began 
in Oslo, which was then moved to Havana, 
and allowed defining the five major issues to 
be discussed. The final stage is thought to lead 
to face instrumentation, cease of hostilities, 
demobilization, the implementation of the 
agreements, verification means, among oth-
ers (Semana Review, 2012). Currently, five 
key issues have been defined: 1. Agriculture 
Development, 2. Political participation, 3. 
End of conflict, 4. Illicit drugs, 5. Victims.
Considerable progress has been made 
to date in the peace process. In the words of 
president Santos (2015), three agreements 
were already reached on comprehensive ru-
ral development, political participation and 
solving the illicit drug problem. Additon-
ally, a preliminary agreement on the basis of 
a justice system, which is the most difficult 
and complex topic in all peace processes held 
throughout the world, was determined by cre-
ating a “Special Jurisdiction for Peace” which 
is thought to be set up within the framework 
of the Colombian Constitution and laws, re-
specting the guidelines of international law to 
which Colombia is bound. “It is a jurisdiction 
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that seeks, first and foremost, to satisfy the 
rights of the victims–in particular the right to 
justice, but also their rights to truth, repara-
tion and non-repetition– [...] This is the first 
time that a government and an illegal armed 
group–in a peace agreement and not as a result 
of subsequent impositions–create an account-
ability system before a national tribunal for 
committing international and other serious 
crimes” (Santos, 2015).
the state: a multilevel approach of social 
change in conflict contexts
A transformed scenario, marked by an 
unsolved internal conflict and an ongoing 
peace process, in continuous definition by 
the agents of social change give rise to the 
necessity to reflect on the state’s role(s). It 
challenges the definitions of the state and its 
supposed capabilities for promoting change. 
It is worthwhile noting that this issue is re-
lated to the domestic approach of the state, 
but also to the unavoidable relationship be-
tween international and domestic arenas and 
the simultaneous state performance on both. 
Keeping this in mind is imperative, since the 
Colombian internal conflict is a national and 
sovereign issue, while its incidence reaches 
both regional security and stability.
One of the possible entry points to deal 
with this puzzle is the proposal of Clapham, 
who dealt with the relationship between state-
hood and the international system. The author 
asserts that in cases of internal conflict in 
which the state loses the supremacy over some 
regions or attributes of the state are blurred, 
or in cases of incomplete degrees of statehood:
The common reaction, at the levels both of diplo-
matic practice and of intellectual analysis, has been 
to reassert the primacy of statehood. Such cases have 
been treated as ‘collapsed states’, in which ‘legitimate 
authority’ needed to be restored; or as ‘failed states’ 
which had to be ‘saved’, if need be through some form 
of United Nations conservatorship’, even though the 
very considerable difficulties of this project also had 
to be recognized. Such aspirations reflect not only a 
diplomatic and intellectual preoccupation with the 
particular forms of political organization to which the 
international system has become accustomed, but also 
a normative concern for the consequences of collapse 
(Clapham, 1998, p. 156).
From this angle, the “common reaction” 
can be confronted within the current Co-
lombian case, in two senses. First, legitimate 
authority does not need to be restored in the 
way suggested by the “collapsed states” con-
cept, however, some regions in the country, 
due to the presence and activity of illegal 
armed groups, have relativized the character 
of legitimacy when it has been historically ab-
sent, therefore the presence of the state should 
be focused on achieving legitimacy through 
democratic institutional strategies and the 
rule of law. Likewise, the “failed state” con-
cept is not applicable to the Colombian case, 
but some Colombian regions require more 
governance effort in order to achieve welfare 
and quality of life in a post-conflict society.
On a more strident note, the resignifi-
cation process of the internal conflict is ad-
vancing. Shifts are taking place, from narrow 
focuses on the internal conflict to recognize 
the Colombian peace process as a means to 
prevent interstate conflicts in South America 
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and rethinking regional security. Addition-
ally, attempts to use the peace process as an 
opportunity for collaborative alliances have 
appeared.
Indeed, the role that is called for the 
state to play in the national and current sce-
narios is taking shapes that are favorable to 
social change, which in practice removes the 
convenient assumptions on what is feasible to 
be addressed by a state dealing with internal 
conflict. The Colombian state seems to be 
aware that the foundations for sustainable 
peace will ultimately need to lead to a wider 
social process to tackle the public problems 
within the country. The support required in 
practice will be defined by the extent to which 
the stakeholders, whether public or private, 
will be able and willing to participate at local, 
national, regional and global levels.
In a more globalized world, the collabo-
ration between actors, multilevel governance 
is a key issue, and in order to achieve it the 
multilevel approach for social change seems 
to lead the state to adopt a “coach role”. 
Indeed, such a role for the state results in 
revisiting inflexible state definitions. There-
fore the possibilities and challenges at hand 
get wider, since coaching, as proposed by 
Beltran (2013), is the art of facilitating the 
performance, learning and development of 
another(s), and its purpose is to remove the 
obstacles that prevent individuals (actors) 
from achieving their objectives. However, the 
coach role is not reduced to a mere spectator, 
instead it promotes discussions, stirrings, pro-
vokes the raising of new approaches; a means 
of getting at the heart of the matter. If the 
matter here is the success of the Colombian 
peace process, being that the state had taken 
on similar characteristics of a constructive 
coach role and wanted to expand them, then 
the necessity of being assertive in figuring out 
which leadership role is required to approach 
each of the stakeholders at the local level, but 
also national, regional, international (global) 
levels. At the local level, the state needs to 
decide assertively which kind of leadership 
will be adopted in the interaction and dia-
logue with civil society, entrepreneurs, local 
landlords and the huge variety inside each of 
them, victims, public force personnel, civil 
servants, indigenous communities and other 
special population groups, and demobilized 
members of guerrillas. In doing so, it is nec-
essary to identify and take into account what 
these actors need and what their expectations, 
interests and worries (fears) about the peace 
process are, but also their current disposition 
or motivation to get into the Colombia post-
conflict stage and their capabilities, knowledge 
and strengths for doing so. Therefore, gover-
nance at local level, surrounding the peace 
goal, might be expanded and made inclusive.
At the regional level, a key question arises 
regarding the weight of a coach role or which 
kind of name should be convenient to avoid 
misunderstandings for getting involved in the 
sovereign issues of each state. The point here, 
instead, is promoting a collective conscience, 
within Colombia and the neighboring states, 
about the Colombian peace process as a means 
to prevent interstate conflicts in South Amer-
ica and rethink regional security, but also as 
an opportunity for collaborative alliances to 
face the transnational dynamics at stake that 
affect Colombia and its neighbors’ wellbeing. 
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This might enhance reflecting on a relation-
ship between “state coaches”, the possibility 
of coaching within mutual understandings 
toward addressing the common issues identi-
fied by continuous analysis of what is at stake. 
If interstate conflict prevention in the South 
America region is at stake, and if the Colom-
bian peace process success can be recognized as 
one of the collective interests in the region, the 
Colombian state should deeply consider what 
the internal dynamics (phenomena) which 
have been negatively impacting neighbor 
states are. Also, it is necessary to promote that 
neighboring states include into their agendas 
strategies which answer the question of what 
are they willing to do to reduce those factors. 
In doing so, each of the states might be a con-
structive coach within their societies to define 
specific strategies for addressing each of the 
identified factors. Thus, the states would need 
to decide assertively which kind of leadership 
would be adopted in interaction and dialogue 
processes. These processes might collectively 
lead to identify national and regional factors 
directly related to the current national secu-
rity strategies; moreover, this process might 
lead to a reflection on their effectiveness and 
efficiency according to current challenges.
finAL remArks
What can we conclude from this analy-
sis? Firstly, the Colombian internal conflict 
has passed through different stages and has 
been marked by the dynamics of the involved 
actors, but also by inconsistent presidential 
administration strategies. Indeed, the Colom-
bian official anti-insurgency strategy has been 
´intermestic´; it is therefore understandable 
that the decision-making processes for each 
presidential administration was framed dif-
ferently. Specifically, the governmental deci-
sion of either internationalizing the conflict 
or keeping it in domestic stage was strongly 
influenced by the current historical interna-
tional contexts.
Secondly, international studies on in-
ternal conflicts pointed out decisive factors 
that had escalated to interstate conflicts are 
applicable in the Colombian conflict. In 
particular: a) illegal armed groups and their 
financing sources, b) intervention, externaliza-
tion strategies and collateral effects, c) the role 
of territorial proximity on the border zones in 
certain cases, d) the contiguity and unsolved 
border disputes between neighboring states 
when there is a distanced basis for mutual 
understanding, g) periods of a distanced basis 
for mutual understanding between contigu-
ous states, h) the use and abuse of bordering 
areas by Colombian armed illegal groups and 
their allies in other countries.
Regarding the rationale of illegal armed 
groups and their financing resources, although 
natural resources ease the emergence of illegal 
armed groups, they themselves do not have 
sufficiently explanatory power to understand 
the Colombian case. In fact, the armed con-
frontation in Colombia has not been framed 
in a linear evolution, the presence of resources 
and funding sources in the guerrillas’ influ-
ence areas have been determined according to 
their strategic behavior and territorial control 
needs, which are not exclusively due to an 
economic rationale. Although this applies to 
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Colombian guerrillas, it is not the case for 
the euphemistically called “paramilitary/self-
defense groups” and their descendant “crimi-
nal gangs”. Nevertheless, drug trafficking as 
an important source of financing of all the 
illegal armed groups makes it more challeng-
ing to face the complexity of the resolution 
of internal conflict. This in turn leads to the 
necessity to rethink the current war on drugs, 
a key issue for Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala, 
but also for the South American region and 
all regions affected by this ineffective strategy.
In addition, the emphasis given to strate-
gies of intervention and externalization, and 
unintended spillover effects from internal 
conflict, have been present in the Colombian 
conflict. Indeed, events verified by the infor-
mation found in the computer of a high Com-
mander of the farc showed the involvement 
of senior officials from neighboring countries 
and dynamics in those states and their links 
with the farc, but also links with this guer-
rilla and actors in 30 countries.
Additionally, given the role of territo-
rial proximity in the occurrence of interstate 
conflicts (see Hensel, 2000; Vásquez and 
Valeriano, 2008; Harr, 2005), conflict is 
more likely between proximate states and two 
neighbors have a higher probability of going to 
war than any other two states if their borders 
have not been mutually accepted, in certain 
cases. It is important for Colombia to promote 
continuous and collaborative relationships 
with: a) territorial neighbors: Brazil, Ecuador, 
Panama, Peru and Venezuela, b) Caribbean 
sea neighbors: Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, 
Panama and Venezuela, and c) Pacific ocean 
neighbors: Costa Rica, Panama, and Ecuador. 
This is particularly decisive for the non-settled 
territorial bordering disputes with Nicaragua 
and Venezuela, with whom there is a lack of 
mutual understanding.
Thirdly, zooming in on a challenge that 
should be faced in preventing conflict, the 
statement of Starr (2005, p. 400) should be 
underlined: “not only to look at the presence 
or absence of contiguity (especially as a “con-
trol” variable) […] but how territory is viewed 
by leaders, populations, and relevant subsets 
of these populations. The spatial distribution 
and locations of such subsets of people should 
be examined as well”. Indeed, the role of the 
leaders/decision makers´ perspectives about 
territory and sovereignty is crucial, since those 
approaches can justify, more than any other 
issues, the escalation of disputes in the name 
of protecting or promoting national interests 
(Hensel, 2000).
Fourthly, the fact that civil wars tend to 
end on the battlefield poses a startling empiri-
cal puzzle for the stakeholders and actors that 
are called upon to be a part of the Colombian 
peace process. However, the current process 
presents a big step toward local, national and 
regional peaceful/shared futures. This raises a 
series of challenges for preventing the latent 
risk of interstate disputes in the region and 
the importance of supporting the current 
Colombian peace process and the resolution 
of the conflict. Nowadays, the peace process 
presents a mixture of elements that combine 
making a shift in the political settlement.
From a long term view position, it is 
strategic to keep in mind that the Colombian 
internal conflict is a national and sovereign 
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issue, and its incidence reaches both regional 
security and stability. Also, the nature of con-
flict demands going further than traditional 
approaches which cannot respond wisely to 
the current inter-connected scenarios and 
challenges. Undeniably, it is necessary to ad-
vance with more effort on the resignification 
of the internal conflict toward recognizing 
the Colombian peace process as a means to 
prevent interstate conflicts in South America 
and rethinking regional security. This is in 
line with realizing the opportunity that the 
latter gives to raise collaborative alliances in 
facing those transnational dynamics at stake 
that affect Colombia and its neighbors, i.e., 
greater collateral effects and damages might 
occur in the bordering areas where illegal 
groups have rooted their profitable activities 
if regional and binational strategies are not 
effectively implemented in the short term 
and during the potential post-conflict stage. 
Therefore, the role that is called for the states 
to play in the national and current scenarios 
removes convenient assumptions on what is 
feasible to be addressed by states dealing with 
internal armed conflicts.
Fifthly, by taking into account the social 
changes which are taking place in Colombia, 
and the social changes that the peace process 
gives rise to, I suggest that the Colombian 
state needs to act simultaneously at different 
levels and use suitable means and approaches 
for each one of them. It seems that a multilevel 
approach for social change is being adopted 
by the state, but it might also be expanded 
toward adopting a coach role, which is itself 
challenging.
In the meantime, the lack of resolution 
of the Colombian internal armed conflict 
increases the likelihood of interstate conflicts 
in the South American region, since there are 
some characteristics that tend to result in a 
nexus between intra and interstate conflicts. 
However, preventing the latent risk of inter-
state disputes seems to be possible by way 
of supporting the current Colombian peace 
process and the resolution of the conflict. 
From this recognition, care needs to be taken 
to ensure responsible and ethical paths in 
which multilateral, national and local actors 
will respond and perceive to what extent they 
have to be involved.
As a further direct linkage, the Colom-
bian state recognition on the existence of 
the internal conflict, jointly with the current 
foreign policy re-definition, represents an 
important opportunity for regional stabil-
ity. Proximity promotes the possibility while 
increasing conflictive interactions in certain 
cases, but also cooperative, as was pointed out 
by Starr (2005, p. 397) “high levels of ease 
of interaction across borders –greater interac-
tion opportunities– are also related to posi-
tive Deutschian interdependence-integration 
effects […i.e.,] that increased interactions, 
transactions, and interdependence makes 
conflict less probable”. In this sense, the re-
conceptualization of the internal conflict, 
both domestically and internationally, requires 
constructive willingness from the neighboring 
states and their presidential administrations. 
Therefore, responding to the very nature of 
the challenges that the internal conflict im-
poses might be achievable. This is particularly 
important, since “Dyadic territorial wars are 
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the typical wars in the system […] territory 
is not only a key to understanding the most 
prevalent wars in the system, but also a key to 
creating a much more peaceful world if that 
class of war can be eliminated” (Vasquez & 
Valeriano, 2008, p. 26).
Although there are theories for explain-
ing the nexus between internal conflicts and 
interstate conflicts, we still need to develop 
theories about the nexus between internal 
conflicts contexts and interstate cooperation. 
Theories about the nexus between peace pro-
cesses and interstate conflicts prevention are 
required. But it is also required to go deeper 
into how the global war on drugs impacts 
the internal conflicts dynamics all over the 
world, and to a new global discussion about 
the war, to deal with how we should build 
security strategies from the regional lens and 
then articulate them. These issues deserve 
further research in order to progress toward 
preventive means for interstate conflicts at the 
regional level, but also facultative means for 
expanding the scope of interstate cooperation 
in facing the shared problems and current 
challenges at stake.
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